Table 3 Overview of resilience capacities and strategies

Social Networks and Collaboration

Initial interruption of collaboration to preserve staff and organisational safety

Informal coordination mechanisms established, building on pre-existing practices and existing trust and established personal relations (including with public providers)

Availability, capacity and motivation of Human Resources

Re-strengthened role of community-based, mobile volunteers for security reasons

To address staff shortages, task shifting and involvement of family carers. Use of NGO staff for national programme delivery.

CMD workers now in border area supported training in those areas.

Availability of physical (medicines, technologies) and financial resources

NSA providers had retained and could use buffer stocks – a practice remained from previous crises.

NSAs reverted to the local purchasing of essential commodities. Informal and private supply channels also used which had been built in previous phases (also with donor support)

Donors’ flexibility in funding approaches. Diaspora support. Alternative banking arrangements (third parties or outside of country to avoid government scrutiny)

Dedicated leadership and distributed control

Top-down, tight control and leadership actively prevented transformative strategies to be implemented (or led to halt in NSA service provision) by controlling funding and activities, and intimidating staff

Strategic and flexible use of multiple or novel pathways and resources

NSAs continued service delivery with a reduced focus on TB, HIV and MCH services (historically core of their engagement).

Private GPs became the first line of contact

Adapting to new context by reverting to previous practices and modes of delivery (see detailed description in Findings)